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FAILING EXPECTATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT
DOCTRINE IN THE ERA OF TOTAL SURVEILLANCE
Olivier Sylvain

INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurs are eagerly developing techniques to monetize
the massive amount of data that course through the networked
information economy every day.
Major telecommunications
companies and Internet companies in particular are designing
services and applications that lure users into volunteering as much
personal information as possible. These firms use data to market
services or trade with third parties.
Users, meanwhile, are of two minds about these data-sharing
arrangements. On the one hand, polls suggest that users have
serious concerns.1 On the other hand, the sheer pace of growth of
the consumer market for networked services and devices strongly
suggests that they are comfortable enough to share personal
information about their identities, locations, and preferences. Users
do not appear to be deterred by shifting privacy policies and longworded terms of service that detail how much of their information
will be traded.2 To the contrary, if consumer demand is any
measure of interest, users appear to welcome innovations that track

 Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful
to the Wake Forest Law Review for hosting the symposium on digital privacy. I
also am indebted to Danielle Citron, Susan Freiwald, Sonia Katyal, Andrew
Kent, Christopher Hoofnagle, Olatunde Johnson, Joel Reidenberg, Neil
Richards, Zephyr Teachout, and Alexander Tsesis for helpful comments about
this Essay. All remaining errors are mine.
1. See Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW
RES. INTERNET PROJECT 2 (Sept. 5, 2013), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/
Reports/2013/PIP_AnonymityOnline_090513.pdf (“Most internet users would
like to be anonymous online at least occasionally, but many think it is not
possible to be completely anonymous online.”); see also Jan Lauren Boyles et al.,
Privacy and Data Management on Mobile Devices, PEW RES. INTERNET PROJECT
2 (Sept. 5, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP
_MobilePrivacyManagement.pdf (“More than half of app users have uninstalled
or decided to not install an app due to concerns about personal information.”).
2. See, e.g., Vindu Goel & Edward Wyatt, Facebook Privacy Change Is
Subject of F.T.C. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2013, at B1; Claire Cain Miller
& Vindu Goel, Google to Sell Users’ Endorsements, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2013, at
B1.
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and even predict their tastes for new products and services.3 Users
appear to expect that their personal data is the proverbial grist for
today’s networked information economy.
In this way, the networked information economy has done
wonders for government surveillance as well. It is no longer a secret
today that federal, state, and local officials use the massive stores of
available data to paint a “mosaic” of users’ past and current
behaviors.4 This potential for total government surveillance has
opened the door to a whole new era that is evocative of the dystopic
portrayals in popular books and films like 1984 and Minority Report.
Every moment that a user is connected to the network has become
an opportunity to be surveilled by law enforcement and national
security agencies.5 The sense of being watched all the time could
chill users’ willingness to speak their minds and associate with
others in ways that are evocative of totalitarianism.
In this way, the large-scale law enforcement practice of
collecting and sorting data is just one aspect of the “total
surveillance” characteristic of the whole networked information
economy.6 Again, in spite of polls that suggest consumer unease
about government surveillance, users nevertheless expect to give
their personal information as the presumptive price to pay for being
fully connected.
But there is one important difference. Commercial behavioral
tracking and profiling is not held to as high a standard as
government surveillance. Governments are limited by the warrant
requirement under the Fourth Amendment; police officials cannot
search someone without a particularized showing to a court that an
investigating officer has probable cause to believe that some specific
criminal activity is afoot.7 In the event law enforcement officials do
not obtain a warrant, courts make two related inquiries to

3. See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK
(2013) (describing how trends on social media websites can be used in this way).
This paradox in consumer expectations is not new. Users were conflicted in the
decades before the Court decided Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), on how much they trusted law
enforcement officials—that is, assuming they even gave state surveillance any
thought. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of
the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2004) (discussing the paradox in
consumer perceptions about surveillance in the decades before Katz). This
confusion remains today. Id. at 27.
4. Cf. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, C.I.A. Is Said to Pay AT&T for Call Data,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, at A1 (reporting that the C.I.A. paid AT&T for call
data for surveillance purposes).
6. I owe the “total surveillance” term to Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935–36 (2013).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
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determine whether law enforcement engaged in a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment: first, courts ask whether the
target had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time the police
obtained the materials and, second, courts ask whether this
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as
legitimate.8 This two-step standard has been the foundation of
federal regulation of law enforcement surveillance since the late
1960s.9
To complicate matters, courts have also distinguished between
government surveillance of communications content on the one hand
and the monitoring of transactional information about
communications on the other.10 The first category covers the
information that parties to a communication explicitly convey to
each other. These communications could include, for example,
conversations about a criminal conspiracy or a terrorist plot.11
Communications content is direct evidence of specific motivations
about imminent conduct.12 The second category covers transactional
information about the communication, including the times, places,
phone numbers, and addresses. These data are indispensable
features of any given communication; service providers must have
transactional data about senders and addressees in order to
administer the communication.13
The distinction between the two—content and transactional
data—is significant because the warrant requirement does not apply
to the second.14 Courts have presumed that users consent to the
public disclosure of transactional data when they volunteer them to
their service providers.15 The third-party doctrine presumes that,
8. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
9. See, e.g., Graham B. Smith, Comment, A Constitutional Critique of
Carnivore, Federal Law Enforcement’s Newest Electronic Surveillance Strategy,
21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 481, 485 (2001) (describing the federal laws enacted in
response to the decision in Katz).
10. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–46 (1979); Quon v. Arch
Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on different
grounds by City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
11. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 (explaining how government agents did
not begin their surveillance of the targets in that case until their investigation
“had established a strong probability” that the telephone was used for criminal
purposes); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967) (discussing how
eavesdropping uncovered that plaintiff was “a go-between” in a conspiracy to
issue liquor licenses).
12. See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 325–27 (1966) (finding
that the contents of a taped conversation were highly probative in determining
whether petitioner knowingly attempted to obstruct justice).
13. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43.
14. Id. at 745–46.
15. Id. at 743.

W08_SYLVAIN

488

(DO NOT DELETE)

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

5/19/2014 11:03 AM

[Vol. 49

when users share it with third-party service providers, they convey
an expectation that the information is not private. Users do not
have that expectation for the content of the communication.16
This Essay takes up and critiques the contemporary doctrine by
posing two sets of related questions. First, what are we to do when
noncontent information may reveal as much, if not more, intimate
information about users than the content of communications do?
That is, what if noncontent data reveal detailed information about
favorite locations, periodic habits and dealings, and associations?
Second, should we continue to allow service providers to trade
noncontent transactional user data with governments without
restriction when users volunteer those data for the sole purpose of
obtaining the specific underlying service? Does it matter that, in the
aggregate, transactional data expose behavioral patterns that users
do not fully appreciate about themselves when they volunteer them
to their service providers?
I argue here that today’s reasonable expectation test and the
third-party doctrine have little to nothing to offer by way of privacy
protection if users today are at least conflicted about whether
transactional noncontent data should be shared with third parties,
including law enforcement officials. This uncertainty about how to
define public expectation as a descriptive matter, I argue, has
compelled courts to defer to legislatures to find out what public
expectation ought to be as a matter of law. Courts and others
presume that legislatures are far better than courts at defining
public expectations about emergent technologies.17 Legislatures,
courts posit, are designed to receive all manner of evidence about
public expectations and, subsequently, articulate their findings and
conclusions in statutes. Elected officials, after all, must be true to
their constituents’ desires if they are to stay in office.
Courts, meanwhile, are by design isolated from electoral
politics. It is in this vein that even they seem to agree that there is
only so much they can say about public expectations of privacy in
the context of emergent surveillance techniques.18 Courts do not
have at their disposal any articulated process in Fourth Amendment

16. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
17. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805–06,
855 (2004) (arguing that legislatures, rather than courts, should determine
search-and-seizure rules when technology is in flux); see also Richards, supra
note 6, at 1958 (“Professor Orin Kerr is correct when he argues that federal
statutory law has advantages over the Fourth Amendment in guarding against
surveillance in the digital age. Not only is statutory law easier to change, but it
also can be applied to bind both government and nongovernment actors.”
(internal citation omitted)).
18. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the legislature may be best suited to deal with privacy
concerns stemming from new forms of technology).
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doctrine to discover public expectation as a matter of course. Public
expectation is more like a legislative fact, far better suited to
discovery and deliberation in legislatures.19
I argue here that the reasonable expectation standard is
particularly flawed if it has the effect of encouraging judges to seek
guidance from legislatures on constitutional norms and principles.
Judicial review is the vital antimajoritarian check against excessive
government intrusions on individual liberty under our constitutional
scheme. This is a responsibility that courts cannot pass off to the
political branches when, as is the case today, most people expect
that the cost of network connection is total surveillance.
Court-administered privacy law doctrine accordingly must
change if the protection against “unreasonable searches and
seizures” is to have any positive legal meaning. The current courtcreated doctrine will not be able to keep up if it compels judges to
measure public expectation. It is time for courts to reassert their
positive duty to say what privacy law is.
I. TOTAL SURVEILLANCE
A.

The New Normal

The vast majority of people in the United States today take
affirmative steps to keep their online behavior private.20 Most,
however, also believe that these efforts only go so far.21 They expect
that, no matter their efforts, most of what they do online can be
discovered.22
Indeed, despite their misgivings, participation and upload rates
at the top social networking sites and applications continue to grow.
For example, over 1.2 billion users log in to their Facebook accounts
at least every month.23 That is around one-third greater than the
number of user accounts Facebook had just a year before.24 Of
these, about 700 million are active daily users.25 These users upload
an average of more than 350 million photos every day, with a huge
fraction of these pictures coming from smartphone cameras.26
Meanwhile, about 500 million people have active Twitter accounts
19. Id. at 964.
20. See Rainie et al., supra note 1; see also Boyles et al., supra note 1.
21. See Rainie et al., supra note 1, at 12 (“Most do not think it is possible to
be completely anonymous online, though a healthy minority believe they can be
totally hidden.”).
22. Id.
23. Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 24 (Nov. 1, 2013).
24. See Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 20 (Oct. 24, 2012)
(reporting the monthly active users at 1.01 billion as of Sept. 30, 2012).
25. See Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 23 (Nov. 1, 2013).
26. Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Feb. 1, 2013); see also
Always Connected: How Smartphones and Social Keep Us Engaged, IDC 6–7
(2013), https://fb-public.app.box.com/s/3iq5x6uwnqtq7ki4q8wk.
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from which they post nearly fifty-eight million tweets and photos
every day.27 If these popular Internet-based applications are any
indication of how willing users are to publicize their personal
information, we can assume that, no matter how uneasy they may
be about disclosing so much,28 users are still willing to do it.
Facebook, Twitter, and most other Internet companies generally
do not have misgivings about collecting users’ personal information.
To the contrary, they see personal user data as the currency of the
networked information economy.29 For them, it is to be “reused,
repurposed and sold to other companies” for secondary uses that no
one really anticipated when the data were first collected.30 As we
speak, these firms are developing creative new techniques for
tracking users’ online behavior.31
B.

Collection, Aggregation, and Sharing

In short, user tracking involves the collection, storage, and
analysis of user data.32 Sites and applications administer user
information in this way in order to provide a specific, ostensibly
user-friendly service.33 Consider Amazon, Zappos, or any retail
website which, upon a user search, lists the items sought by a user
but also makes recommendations about other items that might
interest the user.
Collection and analysis in this case is

27. Twitter, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 1 (Oct. 3, 2013)
(reporting the monthly active users as 215 million, and 500 million tweets per
day as of October 3, 2013).
28. See Internet Freedom Group Splits from Tech Companies over
Surveillance Concerns, HILL (Oct. 10, 2013, 6:41 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hil
licon-valley/technology/327831-internet-freedom-group-splits-from-techcompanies-over-surveillance-concerns.
29. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Somini Sengupta, Selling Secrets of
Phone Users to Advertisers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at 1 (discussing how
companies like Google and Facebook are trying to find new ways to monetize
their user bases by finding way to target them with specific ads); Danny
Yadron, Private-Data Firms Draw Fire of FTC, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2013, at B2
(reporting on how tech companies selling personal data might violate federal
privacy law).
30. Michiko Kakutani, Watched by the Web: Surveillance Is Reborn, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2013, at C1 (reviewing Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth
Cukier’s book, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE,
WORK, AND THINK (2013)).
31. See, e.g., Several Top Websites Use Device Fingerprinting to Secretly
Track Users, PHYS.ORG (Oct. 10, 2013), http://phys.org/news/2013-10-websitesdevice-fingerprinting-secretly-track.html; Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How to
Prevent Device Fingerprinting, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2010, 11:32 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/11/30/how-to-prevent-device-fingerprinting/.
32. See, e.g., Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2013),
https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy (discussing how Facebook
tracks, stores, and uses user data).
33. Id.
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contemporaneous and generally incidental to providing the services
or products for which users sign up or log in.
Service providers, sites, and applications also hold the data for
business-related purposes related to the underlying service or for
use at some future date for some presently unknown future
purpose.34 For example, a department store might use data about a
user’s purchases of a specific line of men’s clothing to market a novel
new male antiperspirant. Or, more pertinently, it might sell or
trade that information to another company with an interest in
knowing who is buying a certain kind of product.
As intrusive as total surveillance is, most users seem resigned
to the fact that service providers and online applications share their
personal information with third-party data aggregators.35 These
aggregators—social networking sites and Internet search
companies, as well as large credit agencies and commercial data
brokers—hold extraordinary amounts of information about users.36
With so much data comes the awesome power to define users based
on disparate bits of information. Data holders can be a user’s most
trusted guide in a foreign country. But they might also use the
information to guide you to more expensive products or even to
destroy your reputation and economic well-being.37
These firms, meanwhile, assume that the benefits of large-scale
data aggregation and sorting far exceed any of the disadvantages.
Google and Facebook have developed algorithms that analyze the
finest details of users’ online behavior and send targeted
advertisements to those users based on that information.38 Users do
34. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124–25 (9th Cir.
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). See
generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1323–24 (2000) (discussing how
aggregating and analyzing user data stored at “data warehouses” can reveal
patterns in user behavior).
35. See, e.g., Hadley Malcolm, Millennials Don’t Worry About Online
Privacy, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2013, 8:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/m
oney/business/2013/04/21/millennials-personal-info-online/2087989/ (discussing
the millennial generation’s willingness to post personal information about
themselves on the Internet).
36. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User
Control in the Aga of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 240 (2013).
37. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1249, 1258 (2008); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to
the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1760 (2010)
(discussing “database[s] of ruin”); see also Ryan Calo, Digital Market
Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 29),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309703##.
38. See Katja de Vries, Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn:
A Parable and a First Analysis, in PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE
COMPUTATIONAL TURN: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF
TECHNOLOGY 44, 52 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Katja de Vries eds., 2013)
(discussing “machine learning”).
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not seem particularly bothered by disclosures because they continue
to acquire applications that know or predict their tastes before they
even know what they want.39
C.

Paradoxes in Expectation

Private companies are not the only entities that trade and share
users’ personal online information. Governments, too, are in the
business of collecting and analyzing personal data, and sometimes
purchasing them.40 Their reasons, however, are different. Federal,
state, and local agencies generally rely on the interests in national
security, law enforcement, and public safety. Emergent surveillance
technologies are perfectly suited to achieving these public ends.41
Properly designed algorithms can help to search online data for
possible wrongdoing and even anticipate lawlessness.42
What has emerged, then, is a government-industry partnership
that, on the one hand, counts on users’ demonstrable willingness to
share personal information with data brokers and, on the other
hand, furthers the government interest in public safety.43 This is
not a devious plan that was hatched in some dark, shadowy office on
Capitol Hill or at Fort Meade, although it sometimes feels that
way.44 The Internet’s early designers and proponents did not have
total surveillance in mind. To the contrary, the early designers
sought to avert centralized control, placing the intelligence of the
network at the “ends” with users.
The Internet changed quite dramatically after Congress
formally commercialized it in the mid-1990s.45 Indeed, since then,
total surveillance has become its defining characteristic. Today, the
most popular service providers, sites, and applications have

39. See generally ELI PARISER, FILTER BUBBLE (2011) (discussing the
dangers of this new era of personalization); Claire Cain Miller, New Apps Know
the Answer Before You Ask the Question, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2013, at A1.
40. See Craig Timberg & Barton Gellman, NSA Pays Firms Large Sums for
Network Access, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2013, at A1.
41. See Citron, supra note 37, at 1252–53.
42. See Martijn van Otterlo, A Machine Learning View on Profiling, in
PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 38, 103, 103–07.
43. See Bruce Schneier, The Public-Private Surveillance Partnership,
BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-31/thepublic-private-surveillance-partnership.html.
44. See, e.g., Ryan Singel, Whistle-Blower Outs NSA Spy Room, WIRED
(Apr. 7, 2006), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/04/70619
(discussing secretive Bush-era eavesdropping).
45. See Internet History,
CONNECTED: INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.freesoft.org/CIE/Topics/57.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014)
(discussing the commercialization of the Internet in the 1990s).
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designed sophisticated techniques for aggregating and sharing as
much data about each and every visitor as legally possible.46
And users have been complicit at every step, divulging all
manners of information in order to receive the full benefits of the
networked information economy. They volunteer their personal
information to service providers and application developers and,
whether they know it or not, allow those companies to monitor and
trade this information with third parties.47
But users today are generally undecided about total
surveillance when government agencies are involved. They want it
both ways. On the one hand, they volunteer personal information to
service providers and application developers.48 Yet, users are also
wary of sharing too much, especially when the government is
involved.49 They would like to be anonymous online, sometimes
even as they also recognize that complete anonymity is impossible.50
This is the contemporary paradox of total surveillance today;
people aspire to control what governments know about them, but
they also believe that public exposure is inevitable, and perhaps
even necessary, in a fully interconnected world.
II. EXPECTATION IN AN AGE OF TOTAL SURVEILLANCE
A.

Reasonable Expectation

Total surveillance in liberal democracies substantially
transforms the relationship between individuals and their
government.51
The “panoptic gaze” of constant government
surveillance is arguably the most dangerous threat to personhood
and citizenship. Total government surveillance in particular has

46. See Several Top Websites Use Device Fingerprinting to Secretly Track
Users, supra note 31; Valentino-DeVries, supra note 31.
47. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 36; see also Rainie et al., supra note
1.
48. See Malcolm, supra note 35 (discussing this trend in the context of the
Millennial generation).
49. See Jon Cohen & Dan Balz, Poll: Privacy Concerns Rise After NSA
Leaks, WASH. POST (July 24, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2013-07-23/politics/40862490_1_edward-snowden-nsa-programs-privacy
(discussing how users were wary of information being shared in the wake of
early NSA leaks by Edward Snowden).
50. See Rainie et al., supra note 1.
51. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (discussing the effects total surveillance has on society); see also
Nicholas W. Bramble, Safe Harbors and the National Information
Infrastructure, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 337 n.42 (2013) (citing Sorrell v. IMS
Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2011)) (“The capacity of technology to find
and publish personal information, including records required by the
government, presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal
privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.”).
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significant implications for the rights to speech, association, and
“intellectual privacy.”52
Since the late 1960s, the courts have assessed the
constitutionality of government searches by asking whether the
defendant “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” at
the time of the search, and whether that “expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”53 Specifically,
courts ask the two questions posed by Justice John Marshall Harlan
in Katz v. United States: first, whether the defendant had a
subjective expectation of privacy at the time of the search and,
second, whether society generally shares that expectation.54
In Katz, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
warrantless police wiretap of a public telephone in an enclosed glass
booth.55 The majority determined that the police violated the
Fourth Amendment injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures.56 In an opinion by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court
resolved that the Fourth Amendment is addressed to “people, not
places.”57 When the defendant closed the door of the booth to make
his call, the Court reasoned, he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the call.58 This was particularly true in the context of the
telephone, a communications technology that had come to occupy a
“vital role” in society.59
Justice Harlan departed from the majority opinion to make
plain that the property-based approach was inadequate to address
nontrespassory government surveillance.60 In an earlier line of
cases, the Court had allowed government wiretaps of telephone
conversations because the interception occurred outside of the
defendant’s private property.61 The Fourth Amendment, however,
was not solely addressed when addressing physical intrusions by a
tangible object, Justice Harlan explained.62 Such an approach “in

52. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387–389
(2008); see also Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J.
689, 691, 693 (2013).
53. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954–55; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33
(2000).
54. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 350 (majority opinion).
56. Id. at 359.
57. Id. at 351. In Berger, decided six months before Katz, the Court hinted
that a property-based approach to privacy was insufficient when analyzing
nontrespassory surveillance. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45–49
(1967). In Katz, the Court overturned such an approach. See Katz, 389 U.S. at
359.
58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
59. Id. at 352.
60. Id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 362.
62. Id.
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the present day,” he continued, is “bad physics as well as bad law”
since “reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by
electronic as well as physical invasion.”63
In the end, the majority opinion and Justice Harlan’s important
elaboration caused “a profound shift in Fourth Amendment
analysis.”64 Courts have since relied on Harlan’s concurrence in
particular to review a wide range of cases involving government
surveillance and a wide range of technologies, including overhead
flights, thermal imaging devices, drug-sniffing dogs, and GPS
tracking.65
B.

Trespass

As foundational as it is to the analysis of law enforcement
surveillance techniques today, the reasonable expectation standard
does not exclusively determine whether government surveillance
amounts to a search under the Fourth Amendment.66 The propertybased approach has retained a place in the doctrine. Through a
series of relatively recent opinions authored by Justice Antonin
Scalia, the Court has relied on the explicit enumeration of tangible
property in the text of the Fourth Amendment (i.e., “persons,
houses, papers, and effects”) to identify a property-based conception
of privacy.67
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in United States v.
Jones is the most recent articulation of this approach.68 At issue in
that case was the constitutionality of a police department’s
surreptitious tracking of a defendant’s vehicle over the course of four
weeks.69 The Court held that attaching the GPS device and using it
to track the defendant for a long period—well past the time allowed
in the original warrant—constituted an unconstitutional search.70
Writing for five members of the majority, Justice Scalia explained
that the Fourth Amendment protection against searches is tied to

63. Id. The Fourth Amendment, Justice Harlan would elaborate four years
later, required a far more searching inquiry into the relative risks of the search
to citizenship in the contemporary context. United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 750 (2005).
65. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–17 (2013); Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32–33 (2000); see also United States v. Garcia, 474
F.3d 994, 996–97 (7th Cir. 2007).
66. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“Fourth Amendment
rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”).
67. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32–33; see also Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414; Jones,
132 S. Ct. at 949.
68. Jones,132 S. Ct. at 949.
69. Id. at 948.
70. Id. at 948–49.
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common-law trespass.71 The police officers, he concluded, intruded
on the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when they attached
and used the tracking device.72
Justice Scalia’s Jones opinion is not the first time he has
asserted that the trespass rule is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment right. Kyllo involved a thermal-imaging device that
police used on a public street to measure heat emanating from
inside a home.73 (High temperatures suggest that the inhabitant
has an indoor greenhouse or, more specifically, is growing
marijuana.) Justice Scalia explained on behalf of the majority that
privacy in the home was the “minimum expectation” under the
Fourth Amendment.74 The home, he continued, has long been
recognized by society as “a constitutionally protected area.”75 In
Florida v. Jardines,76 a much more recent case involving the use of
drug-sniffing dogs just outside of a home, Justice Scalia, again
writing for the Court, observed that private homes are where
“privacy expectations are most heightened.”77 The home, he wrote,
“is first among equals” in Fourth Amendment analysis.78
C.

Nontrespassory Surveillance

In concurring opinions, Justices Sotomayor and Alito agreed
with the majority’s decision in Jones.79 But their opinions help
clarify the scope of the current doctrine as it relates to total
surveillance.
Justice Sotomayor agreed that the trespass rule represented “an
irreducible constitutional minimum” of constitutional protection.80
She, however, also would have held that an unreasonable search
occurs whenever the government collects “a substantial quantum of
intimate information about any person whom . . . in its unfettered
discretion, [it] chooses to track.”81 The trespass rule alone, she
explained, has very little applicability today, in the era of total
surveillance.82 The government’s “unrestrained power to assemble
71. Id. at 950 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34); see also United States v. PereaRey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has explained
that the role of reasonable expectation analysis in evaluating the
constitutionality of searches of the curtilage is only in determining the scope of
the curtilage, and not the propriety of the intrusion.”).
72. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
73. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
74. Id. at 34.
75. Id.
76. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
77. Id. at 1414–15 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)).
78. Id. at 1414.
79. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring);
id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 956.
82. Id. at 955.
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data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse”
and “chills associational and expressive freedoms.”83 She wrote her
opinion to affirm that the Katz test only “augmented” Fourth
Amendment doctrine and “did not displace or diminish, the commonlaw trespassory test,” which, she argued, was sufficient to resolve
the dispute before the Court.84
Justice Alito, in contrast, was sharply critical of the trespass
rule.
He too would have determined that the GPS-tracking
technique at issue was unreasonable, but, unlike the majority, he
would have asked whether the technique “involved a degree of
intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”85
Wherever the line between reasonable and unreasonable lies, he
concluded, surveillance over the course of four weeks is undoubtedly
unreasonable.86
What is more, Justice Alito continued, the trespass rule on
which Justice Scalia relied was inadequate to assess emergent
nontrespassory surveillance techniques like the continuous fourweek GPS tracking at issue in the case.87 The majority, Justice
Alito continued, seemed to be drawing on a discredited pre-Katz line
of cases in which nontrespassory surveillance of electronic
communications was not considered a search under the Fourth
Amendment.88 The trespass rule, he explained, fails to address
persistent unwanted nonphysical surveillance.89 And worse, he
continued, the rule would lead to incongruous results where, for
example, attaching an electronic tracking device to a vehicle is
forbidden while persistent nontrespassory physical surveillance of
the defendant’s movements on public roads is not.90 In short,
Justice Alito concluded, the trespass rule of privacy is beside the
point in an era of total nontrespassory surveillance.91
Justice Scalia answered Justice Alito’s concurrence by
recognizing that trespass is not “the exclusive test” under the
Fourth Amendment.92
“Situations involving merely the
83. Id. at 956.
84. Id. at 955.
85. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 958, 964 (distinguishing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983), and holding that the use of surreptitiously planted beeper to monitor
vehicle’s movements on public roads was not a search).
87. Id. at 958 (“Is it possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted
himself somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order
to monitor the movements of the coach’s owner?” (internal citation omitted)); cf.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A]
man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy.”).
88. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and other cases).
89. Id. at 962.
90. Id. at 961.
91. See id. at 959–61.
92. Id. at 953 (majority opinion).
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transmission of electronic signals without trespass,” he explained,
“would remain subject to Katz analysis.”93 However, “Jones’s Fourth
Amendment rights,” he observed, “do not rise or fall with the Katz
formulation.”94 The Court is not required to employ the reasonable
expectation test under the Fourth Amendment.95 Nor, he explained,
is the Katz analysis necessary to resolve the specific dispute before
the Court.96 Justice Alito’s hypothetical scenario of persistent
nontrespassory physical surveillance on public roads, he asserted,
would have to be addressed if that case comes before the Court.97
Rather, Justice Scalia concluded, the core traditional constitutional
interest in protecting physical intrusions on tangible property is
sufficient to invalidate the police’s technique.98
Despite Justice Scalia’s efforts, however, five members of the
current Court now would recognize that persistent warrantless longterm surveillance like the one at issue in Jones is an unreasonable
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, irrespective
of whether government officials committed a trespass.99 Speaking
for this shadow majority, Justices Sotomayor and Alito both
explained that dramatic improvements in location-tracking
technology have supplied law enforcement officials with the capacity
to generate an astonishingly accurate profile of individuals based on
the mosaic of information available.100 This broad capacity imperils
the traditional relationship between the government and its citizens
and unsettles the continuing pertinence of the current doctrine.
State courts have now had some time to apply and to elaborate
on the rule in Jones to cases involving GPS tracking.101 In a

93. Id.; see also id. at 950–51 (discussing Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 176 (1969)).
94. Id. at 950.
95. Id. at 950–51.
96. Id. at 954; cf. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013)
(explaining that a Katz analysis is not always necessary in these Fourth
Amendment cases).
97. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54.
98. Id. at 952.
99. See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
100. Id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring). This reasoning echoes the “mosaic theory” on which the D.C.
Circuit below based its decision for defendants. United States v. Maynard, 615
F.3d 544, 562–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010). According to the panel below, the
government conducts a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if
the information that it aggregates over a certain period of time about an
individual reveals facts that would otherwise have been private—that is, the
information could not have been generated by human surveillance alone. Id. at
563–65.
101. See State v. Holden, 54 A.3d 1123, 1132–34 (Del. Super. Ct. 2010)
(applying Delaware privacy provision in constitution); Commonwealth v.
Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369–70 (Mass. 2009); State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490,
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decision that rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge, for example,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that law enforcement agents
do not need probable cause to use a GPS-tracking device attached to
the exterior of defendant’s work van over a period of nearly a
month.102
Among the courts that have suppressed such evidence, to
contrast, most have relied on the “public exposure rationale” at the
core of Justice Alito’s concurrence—that citizens have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their prolonged travels on public roads.103
At least a couple of these courts have relied on their own state
constitutional provisions to reach that conclusion. Most notable
among these is that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held in 2009, before Jones, that officers engage in a seizure within
the meaning of the privacy provision of the state constitution when
they attach and use a GPS surveillance device to track a defendant’s
vehicle.104 That court focused on the government’s physical trespass
of the vehicle.105 Since Jones, the Massachusetts high court has
stretched its seizure ruling to hold that a passenger with no
property interest in the vehicle also has a privacy interest in being
free from police tracking of the vehicle.106 The court concluded that
“a person may reasonably expect not to be subjected to extended
GPS electronic surveillance by the government, targeted at his
movements, without judicial oversight and a showing of probable
cause.”107
D.

Contingency in the Doctrine

We might assume that there is a significant point of contention
between the Court’s approach in Jones and the one advocated by
Justices Sotomayor and Alito.
According to the latter, the
reasonableness analysis under Katz is contingent on the relative
social integration of the surveillance technique at issue at the time
the controversy arises.108 The late eighteenth century privacy-asproperty framing, the concurring Justices posited, is not up to
analyzing the nontrespassory government surveillance of today.109
Proponents of the trespass approach, on the other hand, assume
that people have objective expectations of privacy in their property,
and that this property-based expectation has remained constant
494–99 (S.D. 2012) (applying the reasonable expectation test under the Fourth
Amendment, relying on Sotomayor’s and Alito’s concurrences).
102. Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 291 & n.12 (Va. Ct. App. 2010)
(distinguishing Maynard, 615 F.3d 544).
103. Holden, 54 A.3d at 1129.
104. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 369–70.
105. Id.
106. Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 990 N.E.2d 543, 553 (Mass. 2013).
107. Id.
108. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 960.
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since the founding period.110 Expectations of privacy, Justice Scalia
explained in Kyllo, do not “shrink” with every new advance in
surveillance technology.111 The Constitution bars any collection of
information that is otherwise undetectable without a physical
intrusion.112 This rule keeps property as inviolable today as it was
at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption. As self-conscious
as the Justices have been about identifying themselves with either
the reasonable expectation standard or the trespass rule, the
distinction between the two approaches is not clear-cut. In his
opinion for the Court in Kyllo, for example, Justice Scalia asserted
that the rule about “constitutionally protected area[s]” like the home
does not apply to “sense-enhancing technolog[ies]” already in
“general public use.”113 In other words, surveillance technologies
survive constitutional scrutiny to the extent the public has adopted
them.
But, much more recently, in Jardines, Justice Scalia cursorily
rejected the government’s citation to the “general public use”
qualification in Kyllo, explaining that it was not applicable to the
facts in Jardines.114 The government argued that “forensic dogs
have been commonly used by police for centuries” and that their
contemporary use is neither unreasonable nor unexpected.115
Justice Scalia’s reply was brisk: “[T]he antiquity of the tools that”
police officers use, he argued, “is irrelevant” to the Fourth
Amendment analysis whenever “the government uses a physical
intrusion to explore details of the home.”116
The “general public use” exception in Kyllo, however, does far
more analytical work than Justice Scalia acknowledged in Jardines.
In Kyllo, it could do nothing other than qualify the general claim
that the use of “sense-enhancing technolog[ies]” to obtain
information about the inside of the home without a warrant is
always constitutionally suspect; with this language, the Kyllo Court
recognized that the scope of the core privacy right under the Fourth
Amendment narrows to the extent users have adopted the
investigatory technique at issue.117 In this way, the Fourth
Amendment analysis under the trespass rule contemplates that
users’ expectations evolve as the public adopts the surveillance
technology at issue.
Thus, even the trespass rule has substantial overlap with the
Katz approach. The Court asserted in Jardines, no less, that it

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35.
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applies to “constitutionally protected area[s]” where expectations of
privacy are “heightened.”118 The trespass rule addresses only places
in which people reasonably expect to be freest from government
surveillance.119 Conversely, publicly exposed areas are presumably
where expectations of privacy are at their lowest. In this framing,
the trespass rule occupies just one aspect of the doctrine. This
conclusion also aligns well with the series of cases involving police
aerial surveillance of backyards.120 In these cases, the question for
the Court has generally been whether the overhead flight at issue is
sufficiently regular and socially expected.121 Some yards and fields
are more protected than others, no matter the implications for
private property ownership.
That the two approaches overlap, however, does not mean that
they are not addressed to two discrete kinds of privacy interests.
The trespass rule concerns private property. The Katz test, on the
other hand, is addressed to intrusions of privacy more generally and
is conditional by design.
As they both accommodate the shifting contingencies of public
expectation and adoption, however, neither really clarifies how
judges ought to treat problems associated with emergent techniques,
including the current controversies associated with total
government surveillance. Neither approach, to put the point
differently, is particularly useful at answering whether the
emergent surveillance techniques of today can ever go too far.
To provide that Fourth Amendment protections against
warrantless government searches are as permissive as users expect
them to be is not a standard at all. By pegging the test to
expectation, the doctrine just recites a descriptive truism about
adoption patterns and product lifecycles; firms design technologies
in ways that are keyed to inchoate consumer expectation and
consumers, in turn, adopt or reject those services depending on how
relatively salient they are over time.122 As such, both expectation
and trespass approaches are far too contingent to be useful as a
matter of positive law. The Fourth Amendment under this framing

118. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213 (1986)).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1989) (holding that
police did not engage in a search of the defendant’s greenhouse from a
helicopter above because the inside of the greenhouse could be seen from above
through the partially open sides and roof of the greenhouse); Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
at 215 (holding that the police did not engage in a search of the defendant’s
yard from the aircraft above because “private and commercial flight in the
public airways is routine”).
121. See, e.g., Riley, 488 U.S. at 454–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
122. See generally GEORGE M. BEAL & JOE M. BOHLEN, IOWA STATE UNIV. SCI.
& TECH., THE DIFFUSION PROCESS (1981) (discussing how farmers accept new
ideas).
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is not a particularly useful protection if its scope is premised on the
public’s recognition that governments have the capacity to surveil
their every move online.123
E. Expectation and the Third-Party Doctrine: The Problem of Cell
Phone Location Tracking
A very recent line of cases in state and federal courts involving
warrantless government surveillance of mobile phone location data
illustrates the point. This form of nontrespassory government
surveillance, unlike the direct law enforcement searches at issue in
Kyllo, Jones, and Jardines, depends on the cooperation of the service
providers who supply noncontent communication about their
subscribers’ phone usage.
The current doctrine has no clear answer for whether total
surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment when third-party
service providers collect and supply the information to law
enforcement officials.124 The doctrine is inconclusive if, on the one
hand, users are willing to give their information to service providers
for the purposes of administering the underlying service but, on the
other hand, polls suggest that users are wary about the amount of
transactional data they volunteer to providers and that governments
have access to that data. As inconclusive as the current doctrine is,
it is no surprise that courts have not been unanimous in their
approach to cell phone location tracking.
1.

Cell Phone Location Tracking

The growth of the market for wireless devices, gadgets,
applications, and services over the past several years has been

123. See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 25, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/freiwaldfirst-principles.pdf (“The chief difficulty with the reasonable expectation of
privacy test is that it poses a question for which there is no good
answer. . . . [J]ust because a person knows that law enforcement agents have
the technological capability to access electronic communications, that does not
mean he would be unperturbed to find out that they actually accessed his.”).
124. This is far from the first essay or article to critique the doctrine. See,
e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 151–64 (2007) (discussing an array
of third-party issues, including subpoenas); Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke,
Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored
Transactional Data, 14 J. L. & POL’Y 211, 242–44 (2006) (critiquing how courts
apply an “assumption of the risk” concept to the reasonable expectation of
privacy framework); Freiwald, supra note 123, ¶¶ 8–9 (arguing that courts
should move away from considering whether users actually know their
communications are vulnerable and focus on the electronic surveillance method
itself); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 113–14 (2008)
(contending that the “Stranger Principle” of collecting information from third
parties threatens to completely undermine Fourth Amendment protections).
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remarkable.125 And it does not appear to be slowing down.126 The
vast majority of adults in the United States own a cell phone, and
more than half own a smartphone.127 According to one report,
mobile data traffic will increase anywhere from ten to twenty-five
fold in the next five years.128 The growth rate of mobile Internet
subscriptions is higher than that for wired subscriptions.129 It was
estimated that by the end of 2013, mobile device connections on our
planet would outnumber people.130
All of these new connections will only increase the amount of
data coursing through the networked information economy.
Accordingly, service providers, device manufacturers, and
application developers have designed smartphones and software
that collect an array of transactional noncontent user data of which
user location data are among the most notable.
Service providers generally collect and analyze cell phone
location data to ensure, among other things, that subscribers
maintain network connection.131 But, as with the data that

125. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, MEASURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 156
(2013),
available
at
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents
/publications/mis2013/MIS2013_without_Annex_4.pdf; Claire Cain Miller,
Mobile Apps Drive Rapid Change in Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at B1;
Trend Data (Adults), PEW RES. INTERNET PROJECT, http://fe01.pewinternet.org
/Static-Pages/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Device-Ownership.aspx (last visited Mar. 25,
2014).
126. See, e.g., Ryan Knutson & Ben Fox Rubin, Verizon Reports Slowdown in
Growth, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2013, at B4 (“Verizon Wireless added 927,000
subscribers with contracts in the quarter.”); Esme Vos, Smart Meter
Deployments to Double Market Revenue of Wireless Modules, MUNIWIRELESS
(Oct. 16, 2013),
http://www.muniwireless.com/2013/10/16/smart-meterdeployments-double-market-revenue/ (“An increase in smart meter deployments
will see the global market for wireless communication modules approximately
double in value over the coming years.”).
127. Trend Data (Adults), supra note 125.
128. OECD, MACHINE-TO-MACHINE COMMUNICATIONS: CONNECTING BILLIONS
OF DEVICES 5 (2012), available at dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9gsh2gp043-en; see also
David Talbot, The Spectrum Crunch that Wasn’t, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 26,
2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/507486/the-spectrum-crunch-that
-never-really-was/.
129. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE
30, 2012, at 1 (2013), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases
/Daily_Business/2013/db0520/DOC-321076A1.pdf.
130. Craig Timberg, Mobile Device Connections Growing Quickly, WASH.
POST (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology
/mobile-device-connections-growing-quickly/2013/02/25/ca98ea98-7f51-11e2a350-49866afab584_story.html?wprss=rss_technology.
131. Indeed, all cellular phones are in constant contact with service-provider
cell towers by design. “Cell phones use radio waves to communicate between a
user’s handset and a telephone network. To connect with the local telephone
network, the Internet, or other wireless networks, cell-phone providers
maintain an extensive network of cell sites, or radio base stations, in the
geographic areas they serve.” State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 637 (N.J. 2013)
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smartphone applications collect about users, subscriber location
data have value over and above their role in keeping subscribers
connected.
Location information can support an array of
geographically-contingent consumer applications and services. Any
entity in possession of location data about users’ phones has that
much more information that it can use to develop accurate user
profiles.
2.

Third-Party Doctrine and Mobile Phone Tracking

Law enforcement and national security officials in particular
have a keen interest in the location of criminal suspects and their
affiliates.132
Relatively recent reports indicate that police
departments across the country have dramatically increased their
requests to service providers to supply user location information.133
Most law enforcement officials have made such requests without
even bothering to obtain a warrant,134 and service providers have
generally complied.135
Subscribers, however, generally do not buy or use a phone
service in order to be tracked by the government. Most users in the
United States apparently believe that information about their

(citing In re U.S. Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S.D. Tex.
2010)) (internal citations omitted).
Whenever a cell phone is turned on, it searches for a signal and
automatically registers or identifies itself with the nearest cell
site—the one with the strongest signal. The process is automatic.
Cell phones re-scan every seven seconds, or whenever the signal
strength weakens, even when no calls are made.
Id. (citing In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth.,
396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005)) (internal citations omitted). Most
manufactures also make and sell smartphones with GPS tracking technologies.
Jagdish Rebello, Four out of Five Cell Phones to Integrate GPS by End of 2011,
IHS TECH. (July 16, 2010), https://technology.ihs.com/388892/four-out-of-fivecell-phones-to-integrate-gps-by-end-of-2011.
132. See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Examines Social Networks of
U.S. Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at 1; Savage, supra note 5.
133. See Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, at A1.
134. See id.
135. No service provider has ever objected to complying with court orders for
foreign communications, for example. See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [redacted], NO. BR 13109, at 15–16 (FISA Ct. 2013), available at http://s3.documentcloud.org
/documents/791759/br13-09-primary-order.pdf. By its own account, the FISA
Court has granted over 99% of NSA applications (some after court-ordered
modification) for user data. Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge,
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to Charles E. Grassley, Ranking
Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/ranking-member-grassley-letter131011.pdf.
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mobile phone usage ought to be private.136 Yet, service providers
and governments have forged a public-private collaboration through
which law enforcement officials obtain location information about
user accounts.
That this surveillance occurs in furtherance of law enforcement
investigations removes it from the business purpose for user location
tracking and into the higher stakes zone of state action that is
subject to constitutional scrutiny.137 The courts have applied the
third-party doctrine to analyze the constitutionality of public-private
collaborations like these. Under the doctrine, governments may rely
on information that defendants knowingly volunteer to third-party
witnesses to a communication.138 The courts have applied this
general rule to cases in which law enforcement officials monitor the
information that, for example, banks and telecommunications
service providers obtain from customers in the ordinary course of
business.139
Smith v. Maryland, a case from 1979 involving telephone
landlines, remains the defining statement by the Court on the thirdparty doctrine as applied to telecommunications service providers.140
There, defendant Smith had made harassing phone calls to a
victim.141 Law enforcement officials confirmed that Smith was
responsible for these calls after attaching a pen register to his home
phone line.142 Smith sought to suppress the use of the phone record
at trial.143 The Court rejected the motion, explaining that Smith did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone company’s
record of the call since he knowingly gave that information to the
company when he dialed the phone numbers.144 Tracking devices,
the Court explained, are routinely used by service providers in order
to check billing, detect fraud, block harassing calls, and prevent
violations of law generally.145
a. Real-Time Location Data
Courts have relied on this doctrine to determine whether law
enforcement surveillance of real-time (or prospective) and historical

136. See JENNIFER M. URBAN ET AL., MOBILE PHONES AND PRIVACY 2 (2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103405.
137. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958).
138. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
139. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 438–40 (1976).
140. Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
141. Id. at 737.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 737–38.
144. Id. at 744 (discussing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–44 and holding that there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records held in the ordinary
course of business).
145. Id. at 742.
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cell-site location data requires a showing of probable cause.146 As to
the former, courts have disagreed about whether governments must
make a showing of probable cause before obtaining the evidence. In
one line of cases, courts have cited Jones to distinguish between
short-term and long-term tracking, which causes “foreseeable
intrusion into protected areas.”147 That is, courts in this line of
cases have determined that police may obtain real-time cell phone
location information to the extent the police otherwise could have
tracked the defendant in public places.148 In United States v.
Skinner, for example, the Sixth Circuit panel distinguished Jones by
observing that the three days of tracking at issue in the case before
it did not last as long and was not as comprehensive.149 Along these
lines, a district court in that jurisdiction cited Skinner approvingly
(as it must) but found that a seven-month-long tracking of a
defendant’s phone presented the same “concerns regarding extreme
comprehensive tracking raised in Jones.”150
These courts have assumed that defendants volunteer their
phone location information when they procure and use the phone.151
Discussing Smith, for example, a judge in the Eastern District of
New York recently explained “that the voluntary disclosure doctrine
provides the most important departure point in evaluating requests
for prospective data.”152 It is not a defense that defendants do not
control or know about the role of the third-party service provider.153
“[I]t is clearly within the knowledge of cell phone users,” that court
explained, “that their telecommunication carrier, smartphone
manufacturer and others are aware of the location of their cell
phone at any given time.”154 At least one other trial court in the
district agrees.155

146. See United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2013);
In re Applications of U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code Section
2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 n.4 (D. Mass. 2007).
147. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 780; see also United States v. Skinner, 690
F.3d 772, 777–78 (6th Cir. 2012).
148. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777–78.
149. Id. at 779–80; see also United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 950–52
(6th Cir. 2004), remanded on unrelated sentencing grounds sub. nom Garner v.
United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005); United States v. Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d
256, 263–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 597 F.3d 492 (2d Cir.
2010); Devega v. State, 689 S.E.2d 293, 300–01 (Ga. 2010).
150. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
151. See, e.g., Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777; In re Smartphone Geolocation Data
Application, No. 13-MJ-242 GRB, 2013 WL 5583711, at 13 (E.D.N.Y. May 1,
2013).
152. In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 2013 WL 5583711, at

13.
153. Id. at 14.
154. Id.
155. See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical CellSite Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Some U.S. district courts, however, have pushed back against
this reasoning, finding that defendants do not relinquish privacy in
the real-time location simply by procuring a mobile phone.156 A
district court in Vermont, for example, explained that defendants do
not volunteer their phone location data during the ordinary course
of business to third parties.157 Nor, it elaborated, do defendants
“expect their cell phones to be pinged in the ordinary course of
business.”158 Accordingly, law enforcement must make a showing of
probable cause before obtaining real-time or prospective cell phone
location information.159
b. Historical Location Data
There is similar disagreement among the courts about how to
treat historical cell phone location data. The Fifth Circuit recently
held, for example, that the Fourth Amendment does not require law
enforcement officials to obtain a warrant before requesting
subscribers’ historical phone location information.160 That panel
explained that callers do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in data about when or where they talk on their mobile
phones because, under the third-party doctrine, service providers
have an instrumental business interest in recording subscribers’
transactions.161 Subscribers voluntarily disclose information about
the call to service providers in order to make the connection.162
According to the panel, law enforcement authorities may obtain this
data from service providers without first making a showing of
probable cause.163
But again, courts are not unanimous. District courts in New
York and Texas, for example, have found that the Fourth
Amendment requires the police to make a probable cause showing

156. See, e.g., United States v. Caraballo, No. 5:12-cr-105, 2013 WL 4039028,
at 16–18 (D. Vt. Aug. 7, 2013); In re Application for Pen Register and
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756–57
(S.D. Tex. 2005).
157. Caraballo, 2013 WL 4039028, at 18.
158. Id.
159. Id.; see also United States v. Dooley, No. 1:11-CR-255-3-TWT, 2013 WL
2548969, at 21–22 (N.D. Ga. June 10, 2013).
160. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir.
2013); see also United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Md.
2012).
161. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 610 (citing
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030,
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976)
(applying third-party rule to records that a bank keeps in the regular course of
business); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012).
162. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 612.
163. Id. at 615.
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before obtaining historical cell-site data.164 They have explained
that the collection of months of cell phone location data could help
render a “sufficiently detailed and intimate” profile of a suspect’s
movements to trigger serious constitutional concerns.165
Likewise, a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court found that
warrantless collection of historical cell phone data violates the
privacy provision in the state constitution. “[I]ndividuals,” the court
explained, “do not lose their right to privacy [under the state
constitution] simply because they have to give information to a
third-party provider, like a phone company or bank, to get
service.”166 Subscribers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
records that service providers collect to make the connection.167
Mobile phone location data, the court explained, can be “far more
revealing” than telephone records, bank records, or Internet
subscriber information because they disclose “personal affairs,
opinions, habits and associations.”168 This information provides new
insight into where subscribers go, “the people and groups they
choose to affiliate with and when they actually do so.”169 Wireless
devices, as such, are little more than “24/7 surveillance” devices.170
People do not reasonably anticipate that as much when they buy a
cell phone.171 “Although individuals may be generally aware that
their phones can be tracked,” the court explained, “most people do
not realize the extent of modern tracking capabilities and
164. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119–20, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (seeking longterm, historical information); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F.
Supp. 2d 827, 837–40 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); In
re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site
Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Application of the U.S. for
& Order: (1) Authorizing Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; & (3) Authorizing the
Disclosure of Location–Based Servs., 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 583–84 (W.D. Tex.
2010); but see United States v. Pascual, 502 Fed. App’x 75, 80 & n.6 (2d Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 231 (2013) (suggesting that, in spite of district
court decisions in the Second Circuit, defendant’s motion to suppress cell phone
location data obtained without a showing of probable cause was probably
consistent with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) and Miller, 425 U.S.
435).
165. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site
Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
166. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013) (citing State v.
Reid, 945 A.2d 26 (N.J. 2008)). See generally N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 7, available
at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/lawsconstitution/constitution.asp.
167. Earls, 70 A.3d at 643; see also Reid, 945 A.2d at 34–35 (discussing
Internet service subscriber information); State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 874
(N.J. 2005) (discussing bank records).
168. Earls, 70 A.3d at 642 (citing McAllister, 875 A.2d at 866).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring)).
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reasonably do not expect law enforcement to convert their phones
into precise, possibly continuous tracking tools.”172
3.

Technological Design

We would do well by revisiting the particulars of the Smith
opinion to gain insight on its applicability to contemporary mobile
phone location tracking.
An important but arguably
underappreciated feature of the opinion is the Court’s assumption
about the way in which telephony works. According to the Court,
subscribers had long understood that phone carriers receive and
transmit calls through service providers’ switching equipment.173 It
was of no consequence as a constitutional matter, the Court
explained, that service providers had automated this process; all
parties to the call could reasonably expect that the phone company
would be privy to the communication.174 Defendant Smith, the
Court concluded, should have reasonably expected that he needed
the phone company to complete the call.175 In this way, the Court’s
holding reaffirmed the longstanding exception under the Fourth
Amendment for third-party witnesses to a communication.176
Many courts have nevertheless taken the analysis in Smith to
stand for the broad principle that there is something about
noncontent information per se that is entitled to less protection
under
the
Fourth
Amendment
than
the
content
of
communications.177 To be sure, the Smith court recognized that the
pen register collected noncontent information as opposed to
communications content.178 But the mere fact that the data at issue
were not the contents of the communication (i.e., the harassment)
was not analytically significant; as shown above, the Court viewed

172. Id. at 643.
173. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
174. Id. at 744–45; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84
(1983) (automating the process of connecting a beeper service subscriber’s
communication is not significant for the purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 581, 600 (2011) (discussing the rationale the Court used in Smith, 442 U.S.
735).
175. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
176. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.3(c) (5th ed.
2009).
177. See id. (discussing competing interpretations of Smith, 442 U.S. 735).
The Ninth Circuit elaborated on this point in a case involving text messages,
holding that users of text messaging services have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the content of their texts but not the numbers to which they are
sending those texts. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892,
904 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario, Cal. v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
178. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
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the sharing of noncontent data as an expected incident of how the
phone company would complete his call.179
Courts nevertheless rely on the broader reading of Smith—that
probable cause showings are not required to track noncontent data
as a matter of course—when they review government requests to
obtain noncontent electronic communication data about subscribers
from service providers.180 Federal courts have relied on this logic in
order to grant such orders for less than probable cause in cases
involving mobile phone records, as well as email addresses, the
amount of data transmitted, IP addresses of websites visited, and
other information about online user accounts.181 The assumption,
attributed to Smith, is that such government requests are valid even
without a warrant because the service provider is trading
noncontent data.
But there is no support for this broader reading of Smith.182
The Court never asserted that the content-noncontent distinction
was dispositive. At a minimum, the opinion is far more complicated
than the advocates of the distinction purport. The decisive factor
instead was how, according to the Court, subscribers expect the
telephone technology to work.183 The service provider makes the
connection possible, the Court noted, by receiving the call from the
subscriber and in turn relaying it to the addressee.184 Subscribers
accordingly do not have any expectations of privacy in the
179. Id. at 743 (“Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calculated to
keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not
have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.
Regardless of his location, petitioner had to convey [his phone] number to the
telephone company in precisely the same way if he wished to complete his
call.”).
180. See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth
Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 740–42 (2011).
181. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that computer surveillance techniques, which reveal email address, IP
addresses, and other noncontent data, do not violate the 4th Amendament); In
re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register &
Trap On [xxx]Internet Serv. Account/User Name [xxxxxxxx@xxx.com], 396 F.
Supp. 2d 45, 49–50 (D. Mass. 2005); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012) (defining
“pen register”); id. § 3127(4) (defining “trap and trace device”).
182. Cf. Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection
for Stored E-mail, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 2008, at 121, 158–69; Patricia L. Bellia,
Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1402–
03 (2004); Freiwald, supra note 180; Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable
Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1578
(2004).
183. Cf. Smith, 442 U.S. at 442–43 (“Telephone users, in sum, typically
know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company; that
the phone company has facilities for recording this information; and that the
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate
business purposes.”).
184. Id. at 743–44.
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transactional information about the communication because they
volunteer that information to service providers. Users demonstrably
assume that the service provider is an inevitable and necessary
participant in the communication when they consent to sharing
their personal information over the telephone.185
In any event, the broader reading of Smith is not useful in the
era of total surveillance.186 To be sure, the distinction between
content and noncontent is coherent; the former is likelier to disclose
specific details about motivations and associations that could not
necessarily be gleaned from the latter. But, today, aggregated
noncontent information about a user’s mobile phone account reveals
information about actual habits and associations in ways that the
content of any specific individual communication cannot.187 This
deeply personal information is unrelated to the business purpose of
providing the underlying telecommunications service.188 Under the
broad reading of Smith, however, it could be traded, no matter how
orthogonal the subsequent purpose is to telecommunications service.
This is to say nothing, moreover, of the contemporary political
economy of the infrastructure through which these communications
pass.189 The local phone company is no longer the “vital” gatekeeping communications monopoly it once was.190 Any node in the
vast and complex telecommunications network is a potential link in
the communication and, arguably, a site where noncontent data

185. At least one writer has noted that the decisive feature of the third-party
doctrine as stated in Miller is the “automation rationale” on which the Court
relied. See Tokson, supra note 174, at 599–600. The Court assumed that the
transition from human observation to automation of the telephone switch was
not constitutionally significant. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (“This analysis dictates
that petitioner can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy here. When he
used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the
ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The switching
equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of
the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the
subscriber.”). But now that humans do not play any real part in observing or
relaying the communication to addressees, users understandably do not have an
expectation that they have waived their right to privacy in the call. Tokson,
supra note 174, at 611–12.
186. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31–32 (D.D.C. 2013).
187. Cf. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–200 (N.Y. 2009)
(discussing the data one could obtain through a GPS device).
188. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Privacy
is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who
disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose
need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for
other purposes.”).
189. Cf. Solove, supra note 64, at 753.
190. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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about the connection may be collected.191 But such reasoning simply
does not make any sense if privacy is to have any constitutional or
positive legal meaning.
Under the broad reading of Smith,
individual users’ mobile devices could always be under government
surveillance from any point in the network because that is how the
technology works.192
III. TOWARDS A NEW FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY STANDARD
A.

Judicial Discovery of Expectation

It is axiomatic in the United States that courts have an
affirmative duty “to say what the law is.”193 The Framers crafted
the Bill of Rights generally and the Fourth Amendment in
particular to be an antimajoritarian check against overly intrusive
state action.194 They ostensibly did not trust law enforcement
officials or elected representatives to regulate themselves.195 Courts
were to be the ultimate arbiters of whether legislative or executive
action pass constitutional muster.
Accordingly, federal courts have no choice but to be fully
engaged in assessing the legality of the newest technologies and
engage in a normative inquiry about whether surveillance has gone
too far.196 And, indeed, from time to time, they have, designing and
recalibrating federal law to accommodate emergent Internet-based
technologies. We see this commonly in the substantive areas of
intellectual property and telecommunications.197 To be sure, in
191. See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
805, 813–14 (2003).
192. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Fisa Court Order that Allowed NSA
Surveillance Is Revealed for First Time, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/19/court-order-that-allowed-nsasurveillance-is-revealed-for-first-time.
193. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803).
194. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
195. Cf. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1904–
05 (2013) (arguing that when legislatures balance privacy “against the cuttingedge imperatives of national security, efficiency, and entrepreneurship, privacy
comes up the loser”); see also COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE
GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 13–18
(2003); see generally PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY,
SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995) (discussing the public perception of
privacy in American society).
196. See generally Freiwald, supra note 123, ¶ 9 (discussing courts’ positive
duty to engage in a “normative inquiry” into the scope of privacy protection).
197. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 965 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1000–02 (2005) (granting Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), deference to
agency decision that broadband service is not “telecommunications service”
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those areas, courts defer as matter of administrative law doctrine to
the agencies to which Congress has delegated authority to interpret
and implement the pertinent federal statutes (e.g., the
Communications Act and the Copyright Act).198 But courts also take
seriously their responsibility to interpret or reject statutes and
agency actions when they run afoul of either constitutional
principles or basic requirements under the Administrative
Procedure Act.199
There is no reason to believe that the newest surveillance
technologies should be treated any differently.200 The Katz and
Smith opinions themselves are vivid illustrations of this, as
unwieldy as the standards they propounded have become over time.
In both, the Court provided—at the time of their respective
announcements—useful
blueprints
for
federal
law
on
nontrespassory government surveillance for three to four decades.201
The Jones majority, however, was not so taken by its duty to say
what privacy law is in the era of total surveillance. It was reluctant
to revise the current doctrine based on the limited facts before it.
Justice Scalia’s opinion relied instead on a far more limited
eighteenth century property-based aspect of Fourth Amendment
doctrine that he, above anyone else, has been elaborating on his
opinions for the past thirteen or so years.202
Even in his
concurrence, Justice Alito, too, threw his hands up, explaining that
legislatures are far better at discerning expectations in the context
of new technologies than courts are.203
Reticence is sometimes prudent. Article III courts generally
lack the institutional capacity to resolve the polycentric scope of
problems posed by new technologies.204 They do not routinely
under the amended Communications Act); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (striking down on First Amendment grounds the
obscenity provisions in the Communications Decency Act that extant
technologies provide “less restrictive alternatives”); WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712
F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the “transmit clause” of the Copyright Act
does not forbid subscribers from watching or recording retransmitted video
streams of broadcast programming on a website without the broadcasters’
permission).
198. See, e.g., WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 2012)
(affirming the Copyright Office’s decision pursuant to Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1944)) deference); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545
U.S. at 1001–02.
199. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009)
(holding that there is no basis in the APA to subject changes in agency policy to
more searching review); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635–36 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
200. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 404–05 (2013).
201. See e.g., Freiwald, supra note 180, at 732–33.
202. United States v. Jones, 132 U.S. 945, 949 (2012).
203. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
204. See Kerr, supra note 17, at 805–06; see also Stephanie K. Pell &
Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards
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receive all of the evidence regarding public opinion or public
adoption of contemporary surveillance techniques. Courts may
receive extralegal empirical evidence from interested parties about
how the public perceives emergent surveillance techniques. They
may also request sua sponte that information in briefing by the
parties. They may even take judicial notice of it, without much if
any elaboration.205
But, again, there is no articulated process or positive
requirement in the Fourth Amendment to discover public
expectation as a matter of course. This is quite unlike other
constitutional areas for which the Court has developed measures to
gauge public opinion. Consider the Court’s standard under the
Eighth Amendment for reviewing the constitutionality of the death
penalty.206 There, it has employed an “evolving standards of
decency” test that relies on, among other things, trends in state
legislatures across the country.207
The public expectation standard under the Fourth Amendment
has no such hook. It is a relatively indeterminate concept that turns
on the reviewing judges’ intuitions about what is or is not a
reasonable public expectation. As such, it looks much more like a
wide-ranging, fact-finding expedition far better suited to legislative
discovery and deliberation.208
B.

Discovering Expectation Through Public Lawmaking

The legislative process in the United States is designed to
discover and articulate public priorities.209
Legislatures and
agencies generally promulgate and elaborate area-specific privacy

for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 150 (2012); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King,
Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming spring 2014), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384174 (discussing the
need for Big Data Ethics in today’s digital society). But see Solove, supra note
64.
205. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454–55 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“Because there is reason to believe that there is considerable public
use of airspace at altitudes of 400 feet and above, and because Riley introduced
no evidence to the contrary before the Florida courts, I conclude that Riley’s
expectation that his curtilage was protected from naked-eye aerial observation
from that altitude was not a reasonable one.”); United States v. Perea-Rey, 680
F.3d 1179, 1182 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (taking judicial notice of geography through
Google Maps).
206. Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–63 (2005) (noting that, since
the “cruel and unusual punishment” standard under the Eighth Amendment
depends on “evolving standards of decency,” the Court refers to the consensus
among state legislatures and global national trends); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002).
207. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–61.
208. Cf. Riley, 488 U.S. at 462–65 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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laws by generally attending to a wider range of economic, social, and
political factors than the other branches can.210
This is true in the context of privacy law in particular, where
legislatures work “to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a
comprehensive way.”211 Consider, again, that the Jones majority
and concurring Justices invited Congress to define privacy in the
context of GPS tracking, even as they wrestled with the
constitutionality of the police’s warrantless use of that technique.212
This is an especially important point as it relates to the
reasonable expectation standard today. Since 1968, federal statutes
have directed courts’ analysis of electronic surveillance by law
enforcement.213 Indeed, Congress and federal agencies articulate
privacy expectations through statutes and regulations that are
addressed to specific governmental purposes. In regard to law
enforcement surveillance, for example, Congress has amended or
clarified the scope of privacy protections as new technologies and
techniques have emerged. Consider the Wiretap Act and the
Electronic Communications Protection Act (“ECPA”).214 Congress
passed the first in 1968, just a year after the Court announced its
decision in United States v. Berger and Katz.215 The new law
incorporated the Court’s approach to nontrespassory government
searches of telephone calls, imposing judicial review at all stages of
a targeted police investigation.216
It required, for example,
prosecutors to identify with particularity the sought-after evidence,
alleged offenses, duration of the surveillance, and applicable laws in
order to obtain a court order to intercept or obtain the contents of a
210. Cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915).
211. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
212. See, e.g., id. at 962 (“[C]oncern about new intrusions on privacy may
spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these intrusions.”); id. at
964 (“In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best
solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”). There are some similarities
between Alito’s statement here and Justice Scalia’s notable concurring opinion
in a patent case decided during the same term, in which he disavowed any
portion of the Court’s opinion that recited the “fine details of molecular biology”
because he could not “affirm those details on [his] own knowledge or even [his]
own belief.” See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring).
213. Before the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(Wiretap Act) tit. III, 18 U.S.C. §§25102522 (2012), section 605 of the
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012) was the chief protection against
the interception and sharing of content and noncontent information about users’
communications. Id. That provision, however, was rarely enforced as a matter
of federal law enforcement policy. See Freiwald, supra note 3, at 28–29.
214. See Freiwald, supra note 3, at 24–32 (discussing the provenance and
congressional enactment of the Wiretap Act).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 15–17, 24–32.
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suspect’s electronic communications.217 Prosecutors were also to
demonstrate to the reviewing judge that “there is probable cause” to
believe that the interception will uncover communications about the
alleged offense.218
The Wiretap Act, however, did not anticipate the problems
unique to computing, data storage, and electronic communications
that would arise in the following decade.219 Congress accordingly
amended the Wiretap Act to address user privacy protections in
1986 through Title II of the ECPA, the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”).220 The strongest protections in the new law were reserved
for the content of electronic communications, including e-mails.221
The statute imposed the same procedural hurdles for the content of
email that existed for telephony, with the exception of the
suppression remedy.222
In the SCA, Congress also made it easier for the government to
obtain noncontent subscriber data.223 The statute established, for
example, a mechanism through which parties, including the
government, could obtain noncontent data held by service providers
about a subscriber’s electronic communications.224 Law enforcement
officials may obtain a court order directed at service providers for
information about subscribers as long as they can identify “specific
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the contents” or records of an electronic communication

217. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (2012).
218. Id. § 2518(3)(b).
219. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 3
(1985), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl99508/fgit-1985.pdf. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 176, § 4.3(b).
220. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100
Stat. 1848, 1860 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712). See generally
Freiwald, supra note 3, at 47–50 (discussing the provenance and congressional
enactment of the ECPA).
221. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703. The statute elaborated on the distinction
between the surveillance of content and noncontent data, but, rather than refer
to “content” and “noncontent data,” the ECPA speaks of “stored wire and
electronic communications and transactional records.”
Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, ch. 121 (title).
222. See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 949–50 (6th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, vacated sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005).
Notably, these protections do not apply to “stored” emails—that is, emails that
have been opened and are no longer in transit. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b)(1)(B)(i);
see also United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (C.D. Ill. 2009);
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2001),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2004). But see Theofel v.
Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003).
223. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
224. Id. §§ 2701, 2702(c).
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“are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”225
This is a lower standard than the probable cause required for a
search warrant under the Fourth Amendment.226
In 1994, Congress expanded privacy protections for some forms
of noncontent electronic data.227 But, in 2001, within months of the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
Congress passed the Patriot Act to broaden the range of noncontent
data to which the “pen register” provisions in the SCA apply.228
These provisions have been reauthorized at least three times since
2001.229
As complex as this scheme is, the Wiretap Act and ECPA
represent just a fraction of federal statutory law on electronic
surveillance of communications. Under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) and FISA Amendments Act, for example,
the National Security Agency (“NSA”) reportedly monitors any
suspects “reasonably believed” to be outside U.S. borders at the
time.230 Congress also has taken the lead in defining the terms of
225. Id. § 2703(d); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 291 (6th
Cir. 2010).
226. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 291 (“Under § 2703(d), such an order shall issue
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
227. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012)).
228. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123, 3127(3); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
229. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 1801).
230. First Amendments Act of 2008 § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a). The agency
does this by using keywords to search existing data stores of online activity.
The NSA, however, has yet to publicize the names or numbers of U.S. citizens
whose domestic communications have been monitored deliberately or
inadvertently. The agency has acknowledged, however, that U.S. citizens’
communications with foreigners are, and will continue to be, inadvertently
swept into their online dragnets, particularly as the United States is the
principal hub through which much of the world’s Internet communications flow.
See NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection Program, WASH. POST (July
10,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prismcollection-documents/. James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence,
has assured that the NSA employs “extensive procedures” to “minimize the
acquisition, retention and dissemination of incidentally acquired information
about U.S. persons.” William Saletan, The Government’s Cybersurveillance
Program Targets Foreigners, Not Americans. But Can It Tell the Difference?,
SLATE (June 7, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/
06/prism_and_u_s_citizens_does_the_government_s_cyber_surveillance_progra
m.html. Since widespread reporting of this practice, the Obama administration
has sought to assure that the proper checks are in place to regulate unduly
invasive tracking practices. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which
is responsible for oversight of NSA surveillance activity under the FISA,
recently explained that it approves over 99% of applications for surveillance, a
quarter of which are approved after court-ordered modification. See Larry
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what is or is not private across legislative fields outside of electronic
surveillance by law enforcement, albeit very unevenly.231 Congress
and the federal agencies responsible for implementing law have
defined informed consent, opt-out, transparency, and confidentiality
requirements in a wide array of legislative fields, including credit
reporting,232 health records,233 and videotape rental information.234
Evidently, the public-lawmaking bodies have been attending to
privacy protection for at least four decades, amending statutes along
the way in order to account for emergent technologies and prevailing
political preoccupations. This trend continues today. Congress,
state legislatures, and federal agencies are considering a range of
new privacy-related limits, for example, on online revenge posts235
and online gun purchases,236 as well as on trading among
commercial data brokers and Internet companies of online user
information.237 Among the latter in particular are transparency

Abramson, FISA Court: We Approve 99 Percent of Wiretap Applications, NPR
(Oct. 15, 2013, 3:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2013/10/15/234840282/fisa-court-we-approve-99-percent-of-wiretapapplications?ft=1&f=1001. Recent news reports also suggest that other national
security agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, have paid service
providers for call data. See Savage, supra note 5.
231. See Chris Hoofnagle, United States of America, in COMPARATIVE STUDY
ON DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO NEW PRIVACY CHALLENGES, IN PARTICULAR IN THE
LIGHT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1639161 (“A panoply of
statutes now regulates specific types of government and business practices,
with no broadly-applicable privacy statute governing data collection, use, or
disclosure.”).
232. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
233. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104–191, § 701, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1181).
234. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711 (2012).
235. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Once Scorned, but on Revenge Sites, Twice Hurt,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2013, at A11; California Enacts, New York to Propose
Criminal Laws Tackling “Revenge Porn,” CRIM. DEF. NETWORK (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://www.criminal-defense-network.com/privacy-california-enacts-new-yorkpropose-criminal-laws-tackling-revenge-porn/.
236. Jonathan Weisman & Jennifer Steinhauser, Critical Week in Senate for
Gun and Immigration Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/04/09/us/politics/congress-returns-with-focus-on-guns-and-immigrationlegislation.html. Of course, that policymakers are involved in defining privacy
in or outside of the context of emergent technologies is not to say that they
always do a good job. Public lawmaking is rife with dubious invasions of
privacy on minorities.
237. See Somini Sengupta, No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, at A3; Natasha Singer, Citing Deep Data Collections,
Senator Opens Inquiry of Information Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, at B3;
Marc S. Roth & Charles Washburn, Data Brokers Face Blurring Lines,
Increased Regulatory Risks, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com
/practitioner-contributions/data-brokers-face-blurring-lines/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2014); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN
ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS
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rules that would require companies to make their data sharing
policies public and also to provide to users all of the information that
those companies hold about them.238
C.

Towards a New Judicial Standard

Mindful of the trend towards codification, judges have eagerly
invited Congress to elaborate substantive protections by statute.239
They presume that legislatures are far better at discovering and
articulating public expectations than they are.240 To be sure,
statutes also have holes that courts from time to time have filled.241
But today, for the most part, judges and some scholars believe that
legislatures are at least as good, if not better, at adapting broad
privacy protections to emergent technologies.242
This does not mean, however, that courts do not have a central
role to play in defining the scope of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.243
To the contrary, to remove them from the
governance of privacy law is to work against a foundational feature
of our constitutional system.
At a minimum, courts are
constitutionally essential to adjudicating whether law enforcement
officials in specific cases have made a sufficient probable cause
showing to justify a search.244 Courts have long weighed in on a
wide range of fact-specific privacy problems associated with
emergent technologies.245
But my argument here is not that courts should define all of
privacy law. All branches have an important institutional role to
play, as all of them have distinctive competencies to contribute.246
11–12 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-erarapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
238. Singer, supra note 237.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
240. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989) (concluding that
because a helicopter that spotted his marijuana plant was flying at a legally
permissible level, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy).
241. Solove, supra note 64, at 761–65.
242. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 17, at 805; see also Richards, supra note 6, at
1958 (agreeing with Kerr that “federal statutory law has advantages over the
Fourth Amendment in guarding against surveillance in the digital age”).
243. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948); see generally
Solove, supra note 64, at 749.
244. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
245. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
beeper placed in a container that was transported to the owner’s cabin); United
States v. Ahrndt, 475 F. App’x 656, 658 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Limewire files stored on a
wireless network).
246. Kerr, supra note 17, at 806; Solove, supra note 64, at 774.
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To be sure, legislatures have been working hard to define privacy
rights since the late 1960s.247 But this activity does not prove that
the legislature ought to hold forth above all branches on elaborating
the positive legal meaning of privacy. The relative legitimacy of any
public law requires the active, coequal participation of courts as well
as the Chief Executive.248
But this aspiration has apparently not caught on in fact. In the
area of networked communications in particular, courts have
expressed concerns about propounding general binding legal rules
prematurely. In the area of privacy law, courts fear that they are
deciding issues without the benefit of knowing whether (let alone
how to determine) the public has adopted the technology at issue.249
Even the Jones court was eager to receive guidance from
Congress.250 As I explain above, the majority there failed to give
any real guidance on the Fourth Amendment implications of smart
phone GPS tracking or cell phone location tracking.251
That judges today eagerly request legislative guidance on the
scope of privacy protection in cases involving emergent electronic
communication technologies seems to be a consequence of the way in
which the Supreme Court since Katz has framed the governing
doctrine. The reasonable expectation standard today is wholly
contingent on shifting public perceptions and anxieties. As such, it
is ineffective at defining clear lines for all circumstances ex ante. It
is especially ineffectual today, when users are demonstrably inured
to the inevitable fact that their personal data can and will be traded
among commercial service providers and government agencies.252 In

247. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 64, at 754.
248. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1061, 1066 (2008); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive
Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656,
664 (2000); see also S. 914, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110701
_amended_asm_v96.pdf (proposing to amend Cal. Pen. Code 1542.5 in order to
overturn People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011), which held that search of the
defendant’s cell phone as an incident of his arrest does not violate Fourth
Amendment)).
This bill was vetoed by Governor Brown, who stated,
“The courts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues
relating to constitutional search-and-seizures protections.”
Letter from
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of Cal., to Members of the Cal. State Senate
(Oct. 9, 2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_09010950/sb_914_vt_20111009.html.
249. See, e.g., City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010)
(“The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment
implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become
clear.”).
250. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
251. See discussion supra Subpart II.E.
252. Susan Freiwald & Sylvain Métille, Reforming Surveillance Law: The
Swiss Model, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1261, 1278 (2013) (“[L]aw enforcement
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this way, the judicial quest to discover the public’s expectation of
privacy in any given case could prove inconclusive.
This is why the current reasonable expectation standard is not
enough. This is to say that the constitutional defense should not
turn alone on the extent of public adoption or use of the surveillance
technique at issue. Privacy would altogether lose any positive legal
meaning if judicial intuitions, polls, or adoption rates were to be its
measure.253 In this vein, courts are in urgent need of a new
standard that empowers them to say what the law is in the first
instance, even and especially when it might contravene adoption
rates or popular expectations. To let the standard stand “as is”
would effectively undercut the very idea that privacy is a domain of
life that is not contingent on public opinion.
At least two reforms could cure the doctrine’s current failings.
The first we find in the Jones concurrences. There, Justices
Sotomayor and Alito offered a useful elaboration of the expectations
standard that would take long-term location monitoring in
particular into account.254
They would ask “whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain,
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual
habits, and so on.”255 In this way, the concurring Justices appear to
recognize that the Fourth Amendment should not merely protect
discrete instances of state overreach but also those occasions where
the aggregation of isolated bits of noncontent personal information
could constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
Five members of the current Court are inclined to agree with
this view.256 So it would not be surprising if the Court adopted the
view in some future case. And, assuming it does adopt this “mosaic
theory,” such a reform would not necessarily represent a
transformative shift in the doctrine. Under the approach developed
by Justices Sotomayor and Alito, public expectations would remain
determinative; their view is that there is a point at which certain
kinds of data aggregation or prolonged surveillance exceed
expectations, and that is the point at which they would draw the
line.

agents in the United States conduct surveillance until a statute or a court
decision restricts them from doing so.”).
253. In some regards, this indeterminacy is among the main concerns that
animate Justice Scalia’s ambition for more formal stability in Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
254. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
255. Id.; see also id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
256. See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
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But, as with the expectation standard today generally, such an
approach is completely contingent and hard to predict as new
technologies emerge. The scope of privacy should not be determined
by contemporaneous public expectations.
Such a formulation
defeats the purpose of privacy itself. And as long as public
expectation remains the test, courts and users will continue to let
their bemusement and adoption of the newest technologies guide
constitutional law.
The expectation analysis allows those
intermittent moments of complacence, after the technology
eventually enters “general public use,” to shrink privacy for future
generations gradually over time to the point where it would not
resemble anything we know it to be today.
An alternative approach would accordingly decouple public
expectation from the privacy analysis altogether. It could assert
simply that long periods of surveillance and powerful algorithms for
data aggregation pose a Fourth Amendment threat to the extent the
information is analyzed by law enforcement officials.257 Under this
approach, courts would attend to the way in which officials use the
information, notwithstanding user expectations about officials’
capacity to obtain and analyze it. In this formulation, as Justice
Sotomayor explained in her concurring opinion in Jones, the thirdparty doctrine would cease “to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for
privacy.”258
This reform would address head-on the fictional
assumption that users have constructively consented to or assumed
the risk of surveillance.259 It is this assumption that invites the
rampant trading of personal user data between service providers
and governments. At the same time, this approach would allow that
discrete disclosures to service providers for narrow business
purposes are necessary for the delivery of new and emergent
communication technologies.
Courts accordingly would bring a needed dose of reality to
Fourth Amendment analysis by excising any broad assumptions
about the nature of user consent in the third-party doctrine. This
reform would recognize that users do not generally choose to
compromise their data about their phone use (or web browsing or emailing) just because they disclose information for the limited
purpose of obtaining telecommunications service. Participation in
the networked information economy is practically a necessity today.
257. See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy,
98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 67 (2013).
258. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Freiwald,
supra note 180, at 746–48; Freiwald, supra note 123, ¶¶ 58–75 (discussing a
four factor test that would inquire into whether the surveillance was hidden,
intrusive, indiscriminate, and continuous).
259. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the
Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1204
(2009) (explaining that knowledge of risk does not equate to assumption of risk);
Freiwald, supra note 123, ¶ 42.
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Total surveillance seems to be a highly disproportionate toll to pay
for inclusion, no matter what users’ expectations are.
CONCLUSION
The reasonable expectation standard and the third-party
doctrine have outlived their time and usefulness. Reform is
especially urgent today, in the era of total surveillance, when data
brokers and governments can aggregate and trade transactional
subscriber data about electronic communications so easily.
Expectations are difficult to define when everyone, it seems, shares
their personal information with service providers and application
developers in order to be connected.
Indeed, Fourth Amendment doctrine today has nothing to offer
in the way of privacy protection when even courts are uncertain
about how to define public expectation as a descriptive matter.
Their doubt understandably compels them to defer to legislatures to
discover what expectation ought to be as a matter of law.
As contingent as the current standard is, courts are right to
defer to legislatures. But the doctrine is flawed if it has the effect of
encouraging judges to seek guidance from legislatures on
constitutional norms. Judicial review is the vital antimajoritarian
check against excessive government intrusions on individual liberty
under our constitutional scheme. Courts should therefore not pass
off their duty to define privacy to the political branches. They must
reform privacy law doctrine accordingly if the protection against
“unreasonable searches and seizures” is to have any positive legal
meaning in the era of total surveillance.

